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 Abstract 
This paper proposes a re-thinking of the relationship between sociology and the biological 
sciences. Tracing lines of connection between the history of sociology and the contemporary 
landscape of biology, the paper argues for a refiguration of this relationship beyond popular 
rhetorics of 'biologization' or 'medicalization.' At the heart of the paper is a claim that, today, 
there are some potent new frames for re-imagining the traffic between sociological and 
biological research – even for ͚revitalizing͛ the sociological enterprise as such. The paper 
threads this argument through one empirical case: the relationship between urban life and 
mental illness. In its first section, it shows how this relationship enlivened both early 
psychiatric epidemiology, and some forms of the new discipline of sociology; it then traces 
the historical division of these sciences, as the sociological investment in psychiatric 
questions waned, and 'the social' become marginalized within an increasingly 'biological' 
psychiatry. In its third section, however, the paper shows how this relationship has lately 
been revivified, but now by a nuanced epigenetic and neurobiological attention to the links 
between mental health and urban life. What role can sociology play here? In its final section, 
the paper shows how this older sociology, with its lively interest in the psychiatric and 
neurobiological vicissitudes of urban social life, can be our guide in helping to identify 
intersections between sociological and biological attention. With a new century now 
underway, the paper concludes by suggesting that the relationship between urban life and 
mental illness may prove a core testing-ground for a 're-vitalized' sociology. 
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Introduction 
In a recent editorial on ͚Life Stresses,͛ the editors of Nature asked sociologists and biologists to 
finally ͚bury the hatĐhet͛ ;Natuƌe, ϮϬϭϮ: ϭϰϯͿ. Reading the intellectual history of the twentieth 
century as a split between those ͚who believed that we are determined only by our genes͛ and those 
who had ͚built a nurture fortress͛ in response – the editors argued that something has now changed: 
due to a range of factors, but particularly because of recent findings about the epigenetic effects of 
stressful environments, the biological sciences have ͚abandoned any concept of biological 
determinism͛ (ibid.). We now know ͚beyond doubt that although our genes are fixed, their 
expression is highly dependent on what our environment throws at us͛ (ibid). And yet, ͚only a 
handful of sociologists [seem] to notice that a new area of potential collaboration is opening up 
without their input͛ (ibid.) If biologists need to ͚learn the language of sociology,͛ then sociologists, if 
they would only recognise this potential, would also ͚stand to benefit from the understanding that 
biology will bring to their own, vindicated, empirical research͛ (ibid).  
This is a somewhat tendentious account of the wavering history of ͚nature and nurture,͛ aŶd 
of sociology͛s place within that history. Still, we agree with the editoƌial͛s basic sentiment: it is a 
caricature – and one we complicate below – ďut it is Ŷot iŶaĐĐuƌate to saǇ that soĐiologǇ͛s 
relationship to the life sciences, at least since the mid-twentieth century, has largely been one of 
suspicion, and even of denunciation (Lemke, 2004; Jackson and Rees, 2007; see Author 2, 2013). 
Such critique was understandable given the bloody history of biological politics in the first half of the 
twentieth century (and earlier). But we believe that there is now scope to imagine a new 
relationship between sociology and biology. The relationship we have in mind is risky and 
collaborative, and yet also mundane and empirical endeavour; it focuses on some central questions 
which have concerned both of these disciplines, but it pays particular attention to entanglements of 
illness, suffering, health and social life.   
In what follows, we take up the challenge from the editors of Nature. We do this in two ways. 
First, we consider what the sociological contribution might be here, and we seek out a more rigorous 
sense of what that ͚vindicated͛ sociological research is, to which the editorial refers. Second, as most 
sociologists would agree with Nature that this is an historical question, we sketch a more complex 
genealogy of sociology͛s relations with biology. We will show, in particular, that we have been here 
before – at least as far as the relations between sociologists and biological psychiatrists are 
concerned. From the late nineteenth century – before the psychiatric sciences became so intensely 
focused on individual biology, and the social sciences made a metaphysical fetish of ͚the soĐial͛ – a 
research programme existed that was simultaneously psychiatric and sociological, and in which 
intimate entanglements of experience, social life, and biology, were very much at stake. We too 
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have argued for the kind of rapprochement that the Nature editorial desires; in this paper, through 
an exploration of the history of those entanglements between sociology and psychiatry, we aim to 
clarify the character of this research programme, to understand its fate, and to think about what its 
insights might teach us today. 
We focus on one case-study that exemplifies the complexity of the mutual transactions 
between the biological and social sciences.  This concerns the association between the probability of 
being diagnosed with a serious mental health problem, and particular forms (and experiences) of 
urban life (Hollingshead and Redlich, 1956; Galea et al., 2011). This association has been recognized 
since at least the 19
th
 century (Malzberg, 1930), and the question of mental life and the metropolis 
was a foundational concern for some influential schools of sociological theory and research (Simmel, 
1919; Faris and Dunham, 1939). From the mid-1960s, however, sociological interest in this issue 
declined, as part of a wider turn away from psychiatry and from the study of environmental 
influences on human pathologies (Schatzman and Strauss, 1967; Smith 1995). However it has 
recently been re-vivified, not by sociologists, but by a ͚post-genomic͛ biological programme which is 
once again addressing the biological traces left by urban social life (Galea et al., 2011). And yet, 
despite the previous tradition of sociological work on these issues, these novel biological 
investigations have seldom been welcomed by sociologists, let alone recognized as reviving a 
longstanding sociological concern. Indeed, to the extent that they have been noticed at all, scholars 
fƌoŵ the soĐial sĐieŶĐes haǀe ƋuestioŶed the iŵpliĐatioŶs of a ͚ŵoleĐulaƌisatioŶ of ŵilieu,͛ 
;NieǁöhŶeƌ, ϮϬϭϭ: ϮϵϮͿ,  ǁoƌƌǇiŶg aďout ͚iŵpliĐit assuŵptioŶs aďout the Ŷatuƌe of soĐial life…ǁhiĐh 
ŵaǇ ǁaƌƌaŶt ƋuestioŶiŶg͛ ;PiĐkeƌsgill et al., 2013: 440-441), and seeking to contest ͚the appalliŶg 
appeal of Ŷatuƌe͛ ;JaĐksoŶ aŶd ‘ees, ϮϬϬϳͿ. 
Undoubtedly these new developments in the life sciences need to be approached with 
caution. However we argue that repeated, and easy, critiques of molecularization, biologization, or 
medicalization have become stale. Instead, we invite readers to imagine a sociology that has a more 
geŶeƌous, tƌustiŶg aŶd Đollaďoƌatiǀe appƌoaĐh to the Ŷeǁ opeŶŶess to ͚soĐialitǇ͛ iŶ the life sĐieŶĐes. 
To the eǆteŶt that it helps ĐlaƌifǇ the dǇŶaŵiĐs of eŶtaŶgleŵeŶt that haǀe ĐhaƌaĐteƌised ͚ďiosoĐial͛ 
forms of knowledge, we can learn something useful from the history of studies of urban life and 
mental health. This history shows how questions that may now seem surprising, or unsettling, were 
also asked in other times and other places: it can help inspire the kind of cosmopolitan attitude that 
we need if we are to reactivate these relations today. 
Of course, there have been many other calls for a biologically-oriented sociology (Benton, 
1991; Freese and Shostak, 2009).  Sociologists have pursued related themes in a number of areas, 
not least in the rich literatures on embodied (Shilling, 2007) and affective (Blackman, 2012) 
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relationalities. The complex entanglements of psychiatry, biology, culture and place have been 
explored in other areas of the social sciences, not least in medical anthropology (Kleinman, 2008), 
and in health geography (Wolch and Philo, 2000). But we address our argument squarely to the 
theoretical and empirical heartland of sociology. In this heartland, neither the social developments 
in the biological sciences, nor the calls for biological-sociological rapprochement, have attracted 
much attention: for example the word ͚epigenetics,͛ has still not appeared in the pages of the British 
Journal of Sociology.  
In this paper, we address that gap. First, we set out the historical relationship between 
͚madness and the metropolis,͛ as it was established in psychiatric epidemiology, and then in the new 
discipline of sociology; we will focus, here, mostly on the American case, where the diverse histories 
of social psychiatry, including its links to urban sociology, have been more comprehensively studied 
(Srole, 1977; Grob, 1985). In the second and third sections, we trace the fall-off in the sociological 
interest in this topic within a general rise of the hermeneutics of suspicion in the discipline, but we 
also show how this research has since been re-vivified through neurobiological, epigenetic and other 
attentions to the traffic between mental health categories and the politics of urban life. In the final 
section, we elaborate four points of intersection between the sociological and life sciences. We 
ĐoŶĐlude ǁith a Đall foƌ a ͚ƌe-ǀitalized͛ soĐiologǇ, oŶe iŶ ǁhiĐh Đultuƌe, soĐietǇ, histoƌǇ, ďiologǇ, 
sickness, suffering, and marginalization, are brought into a concrete and dynamic relationship – in 
which sociologists can learn, again, to track and understand the mutually constitutive relationships 
between biology, embodiment, social life, health and sickness.  
 
Madness and the Metropolis  
The association between city living and poor mental health is among the oldest and most consistent 
findings in psychiatric epidemiology. Much of that research, embedded in dynamics of rapid 
industrialization, urbanization, and immigration, was pioneered in the United States: in 1903, in a 
study of all patients admitted to the Connecticut Hospital for the Insane between 1868 and 1901, RH 
Burr showed  that rates of mental illness among inhabitants of cities were consistently 20-30% 
higher than those for towns or rural areas: ͚the urban life,͛ argued Burr, ͚is more productive of 
insanity than the suburban or country life͛ (1903: 311). Ten years later, another American survey on 
the ͚insane and feeble-minded,͛ showed that ͚fƌoŵ ƌuƌal ĐoŵŵuŶities… the ƌatio of adŵissioŶs ǁas 
41.4 per 100,000 populatioŶ; fƌoŵ Đities…the ƌatio ǁas ŵoƌe thaŶ tǁiĐe as high, ďeiŶg ϴϲ peƌ 
100,000͛ (United States Bureau of the Census, 1914: 50). We must conclude, says the report that 
͚there is relatively more insanity in cities than in county districts and in large cities than in small 
cities͛ (ibid.). About ten years later again, in 1925, Horatio M. Pollock, in the American Journal of 
  
4 
Psychiatry, drawing on updated census data, showed again, that admissions to mental hospitals 
were overwhelmingly dominated by people who lived in cities. ͚We ĐaŶ ďut ƌegƌet,͛ Pollock 
ĐoŶĐluded, ͚the many unearned tears we have shed for the ͚poor, lonesome, languishing, isolated, 
farmer͛s ǁife͛ (1925: 222).  
 Such works of early psychiatric epidemiology, which alighted on the persistence of unusually 
high rates of adŵissioŶs to ͚iŶsaŶe asǇluŵs͛ within urban areas, pointed to some potentially causal 
factors in the likelihood of insanity that lay beyond the individual – specifically, in some quality of 
city life at the turn of the century.  This concern emerged within a specific political and intellectual 
landscape that we can only sketch here. First, the focus on the relationship between mental illness 
and the metropolis was connected to a specifically Protestant, bourgeois belief in the virtues of an 
agrarian existence as opposed to the temptations of the city (Grob, 1985: 230).  Further, as Horwitz 
and Grob remind us, the interpretation of disease in nineteenth-century psychiatry may have been 
more-or-less somatic, but treatment remained both a moral and an environmental project: the goal 
of the psychiatrist was to ͚create a new environment that broke with those prior harmful 
environmental influences that led to insanity͛ (2011: 631). This attention to insanity in the city was 
thus not a concern with epidemiology but arose from a religious, ethical and social commitment to 
understanding the disturbing and deleterious relationship between modern society and mental 
health (ibid.: 632).  
 Of course, these early concerns about mental life in the US city were inextricably linked to 
another set of more general concerns – not immigration from the countryside to the city, but 
immigration per se.  In the heterogeneous eugenic arguments that characterised debates in the US 
at the turn of the century, one specific focus was on the waves of immigration from Europe. Francis 
Walker, the Director of the US Census, the ͚intellectual founder of the immigration restriction 
movement...warned native Americans that they were being overƌuŶ ďǇ hoƌdes of ͚degƌaded͛ 
immigrants froŵ “outheƌŶ aŶd EasteƌŶ Euƌope: ͚ďeateŶ ŵeŶ fƌoŵ ďeateŶ ƌaĐes͛͛ (Walker 1899, cited 
in Conk 1987: 162; cf. Author 2, 1999).  Walker differentiated these new immigrants from those that 
had constituted the America of the nineteenth century, and gathered evidence about their impact 
on the population in the form of maps of population-density showing the prevalence of those new 
immigrants in particular areas. These arguments played a key role in the passage of The National 
Origins Act of 1924, which called for a calculation of ͚the number of inhabitants in the continental 
United States in 1920 whose origin by birth or ancestry is attributable to [each] geographical area͛ – 
legislation which, in fact, was warmly regarded by German racial hygienists (ibid.).  Concern came to 
focus, in particular, on the fact that those ͚beaten men from beaten races͛ – the Irish, the Southern 
Europeans, the Jews – were concentrated in the cities, manifesting their pathological heredity in 
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alcoholism, superstition, promiscuity and indeed in all the forms of mental deterioration linked to 
insanity.  While the leading explanation for the rates of insanity in cities was that they were magnets 
for such degenerates, others argued that the conditions of urban life were actually the causal factor, 
while others argued that, in fact, it was merely that the insane were more readily identified in the 
cities. See Malzberg, 1930, for an early analysis). There is, of course, much more to be said about 
these early debates and their eugenic character.  But what especially interests us here is the kind of 
investigation that began to take shape within this field of arguments about urban insanity - and 
especially the alliances that came together around it. Here, we focus on just one element among 
many: an element that was to become critical in the emergence of distinctively sociological thought-
styles: human ecology (Park, 1936).    
 As Matthias Gross (2004) sjows his history of ͚human ecology͛ in sociology and geography, 
the concept of ͚ecology,͛ then predominantly a botanical concept, into sociology through the first 
students at the University of ChiĐago͛s soĐiologǇ depaƌtŵeŶt. Albion J. Small, the founder both of 
that department, and of the American Journal of Sociology, had already imagined the new discipline 
through botanical and zoological models – as a form of inquiry deeply sensitive to the biological 
constraints of nature and the environment (Gross, 2004: ϱϳϴͿ. But it ǁas “ŵall͛s studeŶt, Edǁaƌd C. 
Hayes, through his association with the also-nascent geography department at Chicago, who gave 
this grounding a specifically ecological turn. In his turn to human ecology as the empirical ground for 
sociological thought, Hayes (1911) set himself very deliberately against ͚metaphysical tendencies͛ 
within the new discipline; thus very much against the Durkheimian instance on an extra-somatic, 
extra-environmental domain of ͚the soĐial,͛ Hayes outlined a ͚flexible model of human society and 
the environment, which propagated [sic.] neither to reduce society to nature, nor nature to society, 
but instead to explore their interactions (Gross, 2004: 586). As urban sociology, in turn, developed in 
Chicago, scholars such as Robert Park, in search of the city͛s ͚metabolism,͛ turned to a specifically 
͚ecological theory of concentric zones, applied to the city of Chicago͛ (Bulmer, 1984: 6). The task for 
such an urban ecology could only be the measurement and mapping of social phenomena within 
bonded ecological territories: ͚the city,͛ Park and Burgess would famously write in 1925, is not 
͚merely a physical mechanism and an artificial construction.  It is involved in the vital processes of 
the people who compose it; It is a product of nature͛ (Park and Burgess, 1925: 1).  
 Paƌk aŶd Buƌgess͛s teǆt ǁas ǁidelǇ iŶflueŶtial. It was also cited on the first page of the 
monograph that would perhaps go furthest in simultaneously expanding the socio-biological 
ambiguity of psychiatric epidemiology and the ecological turn in American sociology: Faris and 
DuŶhaŵ͛s Mental Disorders in Urban Areas (1939). Faris and Dunham sought to understand the 
longstanding psychiatric and epidemiological association between the city and mental health, in 
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sociological and urban-ecological terms. Their study drew on the ambiguous relations between 
biological and sociological research and used that ambiguity to carve out an important and novel 
space between sociology and psychiatry – a space that was, at once, sociological, biological, 
historical, and geographical. As Ernest Burgess noted in his introduction, the study was not simply a 
more local and detailed regurgitation of the association between urbanicity and mental illness: it 
was in ambitious pursuit of ͚the relationship between community life aŶd ŵeŶtal life͛ ;ǆǀiiiͿ. Locating 
themselves firmly within a topographic commitment to the natural territory of the city, and starting 
from the observation that ͚normal mentality can only develop through the participation of a healthy 
physiological mechanism in aŶ adeƋuate soĐial oƌgaŶisatioŶ,͛ Faris and Dunham made two core 
claims (vi). First, ;this is Buƌgess͛s useful glossͿ they argued that mental illness associates with 
specific social problems: ͚cases of mental disorders, as plotted by residence of patients previous to 
admission,͛ decrease from the centre to the periphery of the city, in more or less the same 
distributive pattern as ͚poverty, unemployment, juvenile delinquency, adult crime, suicide, family 
deseƌtioŶ͛ ;iǆ-x) Second, on that basis, they argued that psychiatric diagnoses have predictable urban 
social geographies:  
paranoid schizophrenia [is correlated] with percentage of hotel residents and lodgers; 
catatonic schizophrenia with percentage of foreign-born and Negroes; manic-depressive 
psychosis with median monthly rentals; alcoholic psychoses with per cent of population on 
ƌelief; deŵeŶtia paƌalǇtiĐa ǁith distƌiďutioŶ of ǀiĐe ƌesoƌts…seŶile psǇĐhoses ǁith peƌĐeŶtage 
of home ownership; senile psychoses combined with arteriosclerosis with percentage of 
population on relief and with per cent of population of native white parentage (x) 
Faris and Dunham, seeking to interpret these findings, argued that ͚the human mind is built on, and 
is Ŷeǀeƌ iŶdepeŶdeŶt of, a phǇsiologiĐal ďase… [Hoǁeǀeƌ] the ŵiŶd…is [also] a pƌoduĐt of a pƌoĐess 
of social interaction. Mentality, abilities, behaviour, are all achievements of the person, developed in 
a history of long interaction with his surroundings, both physical and social͛ (152). What is 
particularly striking to us, in any event, three quarters of a century later, is how deeply naturalistic, 
and biological, is Faris and Dunhams͛s feel for those physical surroundings, and the care with which 
they trace ͚influences from the community at large to persons, and from persons to intimate friends͛ 
as well as ͚paths of physiological communication, including sense organs, nerve paths connecting 
with centers, all supported by sufficiently normal functioning of many parts of the body, including 
glands, muscles, etc͛ (154-155).  
 We do not lionize this contribution. The contemporary reader cannot ignore how generally 
grim Faris and Dunham͛s view of the city is; nor how they look upon ͚slums͛ populated by ͚foreign-
born individuals͛ forming a ͚chaotic background,͛ nor their pathologisation of ͚interracial and 
intercultural marriages͛ (159); nor is easy to overlook a general joy in bourgeois, suburban, 
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heterosexual life – free of the noise and disorganisation of the multicultural city (cf. Srole, 1977: 469). 
Faris and Dunham are products of their time in both happy and unhappy ways. And yet, while 
recognising these problems, we draw attention to the remarkable way in which these authors simply 
– even naïvely – refused to take organic psychiatry and social life as separate domains of inquiry. In a 
way that is distinct both from the epidemiological work that preceded them, and from much of both 
the psychiatric and sociological interest in mental health that came after them, they insisted that the 
human organism, in its mental distress, could only be understood as a product and an inhabitant of a 
social world; that the urban environment, in all its poverty, and inequality, and racial exclusion, and 
squalid housing, could only be interpreted as both a bearer and producer of biological and 
physiological marks. Whatever its other problems, the sheer vitality of this enterprise provokes us.  
 
Disassembling the social 
Faƌis aŶd DuŶhaŵ͛s ͚ecological study͛ received some positive attention from the mental health 
establishment: ͚the psychiatrist who is eager for the advancement of psychiatry will make this book 
a part of his library,͛ noted a reviewer in the American Journal of Psychiatry ͚and will welcome these 
sociologists and the discipline they represent as his allies͛ (Myerson, 1940: 997). In the Journal of 
Abnormal and Social Psychology, another reviewer, stressing the truism that ͚social relations and 
experiences contribute to the development of normal personality,͛ commended this ͚pioneering͛ 
and ͚serious attempt to take the patient out of the clinic and study him in the full light of day in his 
natural habitat͛ (Mueller, 1940: 593). Some enthusiastic follow-up studies across the psychiatric-
sociological literature appeared – notably, the work of Hare (1955) in Bristol, and Schroeder (1942) 
in five other American cities. Yet the expansive and wide-ranging programme that this research 
portended, and that reviewers of their monograph looked forward to – ecological, naturalistic, 
sociological, psychiatric – had already peaked. By the mid-1960s, this delicate tacking back-and-forth 
between the natural histories of cities and psyches appeared less pioneering than it did deeply naïve. 
The reasons are, of course, complex, but we can isolate some of the more important factors here.  
 First, not least because of methodological concerns about how well its measures actually 
correlated with individual behaviour (Robinson, 1950), the ecological approach fell out of fashion in 
sociology – and, also, although more slowly, in urban studies.  Under the influence of critical theory 
and neo-Marxist sociology, scholars ǁithiŶ the ͚Ŷeǁ uƌďaŶ soĐiologǇ͛ began to turn away from ͚the 
functionalist image of society͛s tendency towards adaptation͛ (Smith, 1995; see e.g. Castells, 1977). 
The deǀelopiŶg ͚ĐƌitiĐal͛ soĐiologǇ not only made the naturalistic work of scholars like Faris and 
Dunham seem hopelessly old-fashioned, but it disrupted the relationship between sociology and 
psychiatry. If these had once been co-evolving sciences, with a free-flowing traffic of concepts, 
  
8 
methods, and research topics, a mutually suspicious relationship developed in the 1960s. Indeed, 
arguing for a new ͚sociology of psychiatry,͛ in Social Forces, in 1967, Schatzman and Strauss declared 
their ͚concern for some questionable benefits accruing to sociology from its association with, and 
application to, professional practice and service fields like psychiatry. Social scientists generally may 
well feel flattered by the demand for their skills and products. Yet…it ǁould ďe ŵuĐh ŵoƌe fƌuitful 
for sociology if more research were done about psychiatry thaŶ iŶ it oƌ foƌ it.͛ (1966: 3-4). There 
were, and are, very good reasons for sociological criticisms of many psychiatric theories of that 
period, especially those that individualised and de-socialised mental disorder – and of the conditions 
in the psychiatric apparatus over which they presided.  Yet, despite the persistence of certain kinds 
of social psychiatry, as we shall see, the breach between sociology and psychiatry that developed 
from the mid-1960s (Pilgrim and Rogers, 2005), also marked the end, or at the least the retreat, of 
that earlier project in which an understanding of the forms of suffering named as mental illness 
demanded intense attention to the relations between the living, vital human being and his or her 
social, environmental milieu.  
  But there is another important, and perhaps less obvious, reason that the programme 
pƌoŵised ďǇ Faƌis aŶd DuŶhaŵ͛s ƌeseaƌĐh Ŷeǀeƌ fullǇ eŵeƌged. As the emerging disciplines of 
psychiatry, sociology and epidemiology grew and professionalized through the mid-twentieth 
century, the wide, generous, fuzzy ͚social͛ of Faris and DuŶhaŵ͛s ͚sociology,͛ was translated into the 
much more thinly-defined ͚social͛ that one finds in social and community psychiatry. This is 
concerned with, for example, ͚the distribution and determinants of undesirable social and health 
conditions͛ (Bloom, 1964: 424), translated into a series of quantifiable and measurable ͚demographic 
characteristics͛ (Bahn et al., 1961); elsewhere characteristics of the city were quantified into 
tabulated eĐologiĐal ͚ĐoƌƌelatioŶ ŵatƌiĐes,͛ ďetǁeeŶ specific urban characteristic and particular 
psychiatric diagnoses (Rowitz and Levy, 1968). This more formalized and quantified social psychiatry 
later revisited Faris and DuŶhaŵ͛s data with unflattering results (Mintz and Schwartz, 1964) – while 
even Dunham himself was moved, in the face of this and other critiques, to retrospectively re-situate 
his and Faris͛s earlier work within ͚the larger, general area that has been gradually emerging as social 
psychiatry͛ (1966). When it focused on the relationship between mental health and the city as such, 
this literature also became consumed with narrowly parsing social ͚causation͛ from social ͚drift͛ (in 
other words: did urban life, and/or low socioeconomic status ͚cause͛ mental illness, or did the 
mentally ill inevitably ͚drift͛ towards these locales, and this reduced status, as a result of their 
conditions?). The former was usually peremptorily dismissed: in a 1980 review of social psychiatry in 
the United Kingdom, for example, John Wing, then professor of social psychiatry at the Institute of 
Psychiatry in London, firmly rejected the role of social life in the aetiology of schizophrenia, arguing 
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that 
British workers have put several hypotheses concerning the causation of schizophrenia to 
searching test. This is particularly true of theories suggesting that the condition was generated 
ďǇ liǀiŶg iŶ ĐoŶditioŶs of poǀeƌtǇ aŶd isolatioŶ… [ǁhiĐh aƌe iŶ faĐt] aĐtiǀelǇ sought ďǇ the 
individual instead of being a cause of the breakdoǁŶ͛ ;WiŶg, ϭϵϴϬ: ϱϱϴͿ  
Around the same period, writing in the Community Mental Health Journal, two American sociologists 
proclaimed the good news that sociologists might now become consultants to psychiatric practice: 
͚the consultative function of the sociologist,͛ they explained, ͚will be to interpret and evaluate 
computer outputs and their utilization by state mental health offices.͛ “oŵethiŶg has ĐleaƌlǇ goŶe 
awry in the imagination of what a ͚social͛ science might contribute to how we think about psychiatric 
distress.   
We have necessarily compressed a complex series of developments. Yet it is clear that the 
possibilities identified by those like Faris and Dunham – that psychiatric illness, through its 
constitutive association with urban life, and with poverty, and marginalisation, and racism etc., 
might become the meeting-ground for a more profound relation between the sociological and life 
sciences – never really came to pass. IŶstead, “ĐhatzŵaŶ aŶd “tƌauss͛s ĐƌitiĐal soĐiologǇ of psychiatry 
became the doŵiŶaŶt ŵode: soĐiologists tuƌŶed to ĐƌitiƋue of a ͚ŵediĐal ŵodel,͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh 
psǇĐhiatƌiĐ pƌofessioŶals aĐted as  ͚soĐial ĐoŶtƌol ageŶts,͛ aŶd patieŶts ǁeƌe plaĐed ͚uŶdeƌ the 
control of physicians who may employ incarceration, drugs, electro-shock, and  otheƌ ͚treatments,͛͛ 
(Goldstein, 1979). Let us stress again that we are not suggesting that the critical attention to 
psychiatric theory and practice in this period was misplaced, although some of it undoubtedly was 
over general and over-dismissive of the distress that many psychiatrists sought to alleviate.   Our aim 
is to point to the fact that it proved very hard to maintain the broader connections between the 
sociological and psychiatric sciences, in the heat of this debate. If the questions of mental life in the 
metropolis had once exemplified the possibility of a transdisciplinary project between the social and 
life sciences, perhaps serving as a more general exemplar, by the 1980s the relation between 
sociology and psychiatry exemplified precisely the opposite: it revealed how forcefully the social and 
the biological had been prised apart.  
 
History and the present 
Today, things are rather different. In the opening decades of the twenty-first century, there was a 
rapid resurgence of interest – not only in the association of urbanicity and mental illness, but in the 
mutually constitutive ways in which the environment of the city, and the biology of the body, come 
to shape and re-shape one another. Strikingly, this resurgent interest has not come from sociology 
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but from within the biosciences themselves, from epidemiology (itself poised on the cusp of the 
natural and social sciences) and from some new modes of understanding the biological development 
of human life, and its relationship to the environment in which that life finds itself. As the 
epidemiologist Sandro Galea and his colleagues pointed out in 2011, ͚there is an emerging interest in 
identifying biologic explanations that may clarify the link between features of the urban 
environment and individual mental health͛ (2011: 401Ϳ. HaǀiŶg ďeeŶ ͚eĐlipsed foƌ a peƌiod of tiŵe,͛ 
March et al. poiŶt out iŶ a ƌeǀieǁ, ͚interest in the etiologic role of social context has been revived͛ 
(2008: 84). But what has been little noticed so far is how this literature, at the leading edge of the 
contemporary biosciences, recapitulates fundamental intuitions, themes and assumptions of the 
biologically-inflected sociology of the 1930s.  Yet this is a form of sociological reasoning now 
profoundly unfashionable among leading practitioners in urban sociology (Gieryn, 2000; Dear 2002; 
see Sassen, 2000, for a nuanced account of these inheritances). Let us sketch some of the key 
elements in this emerging research-programme. 
 For many researchers in this area, stress has been the gateway for bringing 'context' back in.  
Building on the work of Michael Meaney (2001) – whose pioneering epigenetic research showed 
that gene expression could be mediated by environmental factors – Galea and his group studied 
residents of a Detroit neighbourhood, showing how distinctive methylation profiles in particular 
gene clusters could be seen in residents who had been assaulted, and who met criteria for lifetime 
PTSD and depression. Showing a linear relationship between the presence of such profiles and the 
number of assaultive events experienced by an individual, they suggest that ͚that cumulative 
traumatic burden may leave a molecular footprint in those with [PTSD]͛ (ibid.: 402). Thus, Galea 
aƌgues elseǁheƌe, ͚different aspects of the urban environment are distinctly and variably linked to 
brain structure, fuŶĐtioŶ, aŶd heŶĐe pheŶotǇpe͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϴϱϵͿ. IŶ schizophrenia, the diagnosis most 
consistently associated with urbanicity, Roth and her colleagues (2009), noting the higher prevalence 
of ͚socio-economic risk factors͛ for the development of schizophrenia in urban environments, 
suggested that these factors may have a direct influence on the down-regulation of genes implicated 
in the production of GABAergic neurons that help to control ͚over-excited͛ neuronal activity 
(reduced GABA function has been consistently associated with some of the core symptoms of 
schizophrenia). Thus as Jim van Os and his group point out, schizophrenia research is moving 
outwards, from an internalised attention to the genome, or even the proteome – to the role of the 
͚sĐhizophƌeŶia eŶǀiƌoŵe͛ ;ϮϬϬϱͿ.  
 A different dimension of this research, centred around the German psychiatrist and 
neurologist Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg, has tried to identify the neural processes that mediate the 
link between urban life and psychiatric disorder. In a series of experiments, Florian Lederbogen 
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(2012) and his colleagues were able to associate both current city living, and city upbringing, with 
distinctive patterns of neural activity in response to stress. Their suggestion is that social-stress-
processing (produced by exposure to ͚pollution, toxins, crowding, noise, or other demographic 
factors͛) is the environmental risk that links city life to mental ill-health.  This stress processing is 
embodied, they assert, in specific, predictable patterns of stress-related neural activity, sometimes 
resulting in an organic pathology (2011: 500). ͚A new generation of field studies is warranted,͛ argue 
Meyer-Lindenberg and Tost elsewhere, ͚that combine the acquisition of neuroimaging and 
biomarker data with experience-based assessment, mobile neuropsychological testing and tracking 
of subjects in spatially and socially well-defined real-life contexts͛ (2012: 666). An approving write-up 
in Nature suggested that ͚as well as helping in the design of future cities, such work might also 
pinpoint the most stressful parts of an existing metropolis — and help to make a case for urban 
ƌegeŶeƌatioŶ͛ ;Aďďott, 2012: 164).  Sociologists may point to many limitations in the way that this 
research conceptualises and operationalizes social experience. But what distinguishes these projects 
is that they do not think in terms of a binary division between social life and the body, and seek to 
allocate cause and consequence between them. Instead, they explore mutually constitutive 
relationships, by means of which particular forms of social life get under the skin and back out again 
(Harrington, 2008) – that is to say, they seek the biological traces of social relations, and the ways in 
which the politics of urban space is rendered corporeal.  
How can we account for the revival of interest in these transactions? One answer might be 
the simple fact of urbanization: one half of the world͛s population now lives in urban areas - 
although of very different types - bringing new attention to the kinds of disorders that flourish in 
such environments, not least those of mental health (Galea et al 2011). A second might be the 
disĐƌeditiŶg of the ͚uƌďaŶ dƌift͛ hǇpotheses of ŵeŶtal disoƌdeƌ (Cooper et al, 2005: 331). But we 
stress a third answer: the rise of several related 'post-genomic' fields of research such as population-
based epigenetics, group selection, and studies of mediations between neural pathways and social 
cognition (Author 3, 2012; Author 2, 2013; Meloni, in press). These have given scholars from 
different disciplines reason to think again about the complexity of the entanglement between the 
body and its environment.  
We do not wish to seem naively laudatory of this research.  Nor do we want to imply that 
there are simple parallels between these developments and those of seventy-five years ago.   Nor is 
it our aim to exhort sociologists to invest en masse in these socially-inflected biological projects. But 
we do wish to provoke interest in a ͚ƌe-ǀitalized͛ soĐiologǇ that goes ǁell ďeǇoŶd soĐiologiĐal 
attention to the body (Martin, 1992; Shilling, 2007), and/or current highly theoretical debates over 
affect (Leys, 2011; Wilson and Frank, 2012) We want to imagine a highly empirical sociology, 
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attentive to and engaged in contemporary research in the life sciences; focused on the key historical 
problems of the discipline; and much more ontologically ambitious than the epidemiological 
demonstration of the 'social determinants' of health. It is not, here, a case of sociology jumping on a 
neurobiological bandwagon: the point is that this approach takes inspiration from a longer 
intellectual history of the social sciences, where sociology has not been a passive service discipline, 
but a pioneer, risk taker and intellectual leader.   
 
Intersection  
In this final section we outline four areas where sociologists may profitably think about renewed 
forms of engagement with the life sciences, and with their imagination of the relationship between 
mental life and the city.  
 
(1) Bioeconomies of urban experience  
Even in sophisticated epigenetic and neurobiological accounts of urban mental illness, the 
elaboration of the social environment gets scant attention. For Galea and his colleagues, the social 
aspects of the ĐitǇ aƌe, ͚ĐoŶĐeŶtƌated disadǀaŶtage, ƌesideŶtial segƌegatioŶ aŶd soĐial Ŷoƌŵs͛ oŶ the 
oŶe haŶd, aŶd ͚ĐeƌtaiŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal toǆiŶs suĐh as ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ǀioleŶĐe, seĐoŶd-hand smoke and 
aiƌ pollutioŶ,͛ oŶ the otheƌ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϰϬϬ, ϰϬϮͿ. Foƌ MeǇeƌ-Lindenberg aŶd Tost, it is ͚disiŶtegƌatioŶ of 
faŵilǇ Ŷetǁoƌks, tighteŶed ĐoŵpetitioŶ aŶd disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϮ: ϲϲϰͿ. This is ĐleaƌlǇ iŶsuffiĐieŶt to 
grasp the characteristics of the milieu that should concern us.  One of the signatures of Faris and 
DuŶhaŵ͛s Ŷatuƌalistic approach to carefully-ĐiƌĐuŵsĐƌiďed uƌďaŶ zoŶes, aŶd of theiƌ ͚siftiŶg aŶd 
soƌtiŶg of eĐoŶoŵiĐ aŶd soĐial iŶstitutioŶs aŶd of populatioŶs ǁithiŶ theŵ,͛ ǁas the thiĐkŶess of its 
attention to place, and its commitment to being immersed in delicately-understood urban districts 
(1930, 4; cf. Sassen, 2000: 146). A similarly ecological attention to the contingency of real urban 
aƌeas, to ǁhat Paƌk ;ϭϵϯϲͿ Đalls the ͚ďiotiĐ͛ aŶd ͚Đultuƌal͛ dǇŶaŵiĐs that ŵake theŵ up, ŵoǀes us 
beyond sterile epidemiological abstractions like 'SES,' 'disadvantage,' and 'disintegration,' but 
without abandoning a commitment to some kind of comprehensible – even quantifiable – stream of 
biosocial phenomena at the heart of urban life.  
The ecological standpoint has been criticised for papering over the ideological and political 
decisions that underpin specific urban arrangements. But we can nonetheless conceive of a more 
'naturalistic' sociological attention that is attentive to actual experiences of poverty, and pain, as 
well as to the political economies that sustain those states. Park once approvingly cited HG Wells' 
desĐƌiptioŶ of huŵaŶ eĐologǇ as ŵeƌe ͞ďiologiĐal eĐoŶoŵiĐs͟ ;ϭϵϯϲ: ϭϭͿ. But ǁe uƌge atteŶtioŶ to 
the ways social experience is lived biologically, and the need to develop both concepts and methods 
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to understand and describe biological forms of human life that emerge within, and are reproduced 
by, specific kinds of social, political economic relations. A shared sociological and neuropsychiatric 
attention to such a bioeconomy of urban experience might open up the specificity of the relations 
between capital, biology, and mental distress in the city.   
 
(2) The curative potential of life-as-such 
It often seems that what is offered by genomic and neurobiological accounts of the consequences of 
urban living is simply a biological mechanism that underpins phenomena that are already well 
known and well understood at other scales (cf. Pickersgill, 2013: 433). That is, of course, not nothing.  
But there is thus an understandable sociological concern that introducing biological markers of 
poverty and class, may rapidly lead to researchers and policy makers according them a causal status 
in the production of disorder, and may shift attention towards the affected individual, and  away 
from the way that illnesses are produced and distributed by social, political, and economic 
phenomena.  Thus critics of 'biomedicalization' suggest that it will be the sick body that gets 
burdened with a curative responsibility, and not the pathogenic social forms that produce that body 
(Clarke et al., 2010).  
Yet the thrust of the work of Faris and Dunham (1939) and Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) 
was precisely to trouble any sense of meaningful distinction between social and biological life in 
pathogenesis. The point, as Hollingshead and Redlich remind us, is to ͚attempt relentlessly to isolate 
biological, psychological, and social factors in their dynamic interactions͛ (1958: 9, our emphasis). 
Didieƌ FassiŶ's atteŶtioŶ to ͚life as suĐh͛ ŵaǇ help us heƌe: ͚life as the course of events which occurs 
from birth to death, which can be shortened by political or structural violence, which can be 
prolonged by health and social policies, which gives place to cultural interpretations and moral 
decisions, which may be told or written – life which is lived through a body (not only through cells) 
and as a society (not only as species)͛ (Fassin, 2009: 48). A re-vitalized sociology must insist that cure 
should not only focus on the biological constraints of life, but on the way in which living 
͚simultaneously shapes and is shaped by the political choices and moral economies of contemporary 
societies͛  (ibid.: 48). Of course such an approach runs well known risks of eliding the distinctions 
between harm, pathology, disease, and politics. But in our view, those risks do not outweigh the 
potential for a new 'politics of life' – one that that re-shapes our therapeutic and interventionist 
imaginary, such that the social life of the city and the molecular life of the body do not compete for 
priority but become mutually entangled within a much more complex, and thickly-textured 
landscape of empirical research into the distribution of suffering, restoration and care.  
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(3) Dappled ontologies of disease 
Especially within epigenetically-ŵotiǀated aĐĐouŶts of uƌďaŶ ŵeŶtal health, the eleŵeŶts of ͚the 
eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt͛ aƌe soŵetiŵes ĐuƌiouslǇ uŶdiffeƌeŶtiated. “ĐhizophƌeŶia, foƌ eǆaŵple, is assoĐiated 
with cannabis use (Van Os et al., 2010), air pollution (Davis et al., 2012), migration (Roth et al, 2009), 
winter-ďiƌth ;O͛CallaghaŶ et al., 1991), and so on.  Similarly, even within a single study, we earlier 
Ƌuoted Galea aŶd his Đolleagues' atteŶtioŶ to ǁhat theǇ Đalled ͚ĐeƌtaiŶ eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal toǆiŶs͛ – 
ǁhiĐh theǇ Ŷaŵed as ͚ĐoŵŵuŶitǇ ǀioleŶĐe, second-haŶd sŵoke aŶd aiƌ pollutioŶ͛ ;ϮϬϭϭ: ϰϬϮͿ. But 
the ĐategoƌǇ of ͚eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal toǆiŶs͛ does Ŷot do a good joď of holdiŶg togetheƌ suĐh dispaƌate 
things as violence and smoke – let aloŶe ǁiŶteƌ, ŵigƌatioŶ, aŶd ĐaŶŶaďis. EǀeŶ ͚ǀioleŶĐe͛ itself is a 
baggy sort of thing: what Galea et al. mostly intend by this term is localised physical violence – but 
less attention is paid to the structural violence of urban planning and housing policy, to the 
psychological violence of police and local-government surveillance, to the racialized violence of 
urban neglect, and so on.  
 If we are enthusiastic about attempts to think the place of the social environment in the 
development of mental disorder, nonetheless, as Landecker and Panofsky point out, the risk is that 
͚a certaiŶ oŶtologiĐal ﬂatteŶiŶg oĐĐuƌs,͛ iŶ ǁhiĐh ͚different categories of things in the world are 
made equivalent by recasting them as different forms of exposure͛ ;ϮϬϭϯ: ϯϰϭͿ. CleaƌlǇ, theƌe is a 
role for a more comprehensively sociological attention to the nuances of the environment, and to 
the politics of spatiliazed exposure – a perspective that may not be radically distinct from the 
ecological zones identified by scholars of an earlier era. But we also suggest a broader role for 
sociology in thinking more comprehensively about the ontology of disease, and its relationship to 
the social environment: in place of an epidemiological flatness, what would a thicker ontology of 
uƌďaŶ ŵeŶtal health look like? We aƌe ƌeŵiŶded, heƌe of NaŶĐǇ Caƌtǁƌight͛s ;ϭϵϵϰͿ ǀiew of a 
͚dappled͛ ǁoƌld – which, for Cartwright, allows us to enjoy a kind of realism without committing to a 
narrow and law-like universalism. For the empirical sociology of the contemporary city, then, our 
interest in how such a 'dappled' perspective could help sociologists, pursuing the make-up of 
psychiatric disease, to track the dynamics of flow and exchange between such disparate objects as 
poverty, race, accommodation, smoke, violence, and winter birth. Can we imagine a simultaneously 
sociological and psychiatric perspective that would allow to think the local traffic between such 
nodes; that would attend to the assemblages of mental suffering and distress that they help to make 
up; but that would also help to identify simultaneously biological and socio-political matrices of 
harm-reduction and intervention?   
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(4) Biological localities 
We haǀe talked aďout ͚the ĐitǇ͛ a lot iŶ this papeƌ – but there is, as the British science fiction author 
ChiŶa Miéǀille ;ϮϬϭϭͿ ƌeŵiŶds us, ͚the ĐitǇ aŶd the ĐitǇ.͛ It is striking for example, the kinds of cities 
that are the loci of studies like these – for example Glasgow (McGuinness et al., 2011), Detroit (Galea 
et al., 2011), Atlanta (Smith et al., 2011) – all with long and racialized histories of poverty; often with 
collapsed manufacturing bases; physically and emotionally distant from metropolitan centres of 
wealth and power, and so on. It is also important to consider how this research will be torqued as it 
moves into the cities of the global south. But it is espeĐiallǇ the topogƌaphǇ of Faƌis aŶd DuŶhaŵ͛s 
Chicago that reminds us how 'the city' is not always 'the city.' In their work, it is the American city of 
the war years that is in question, with power and capital flowing to the suburbs, with migration from 
South to North, with localized booms in heavy manufacturing, with increasing desolation of the 
iŶŶeƌ Đities, aŶd so oŶ. Hoǁ ĐaŶ a soĐiologiĐal atteŶtioŶ to the speĐifiĐitǇ of ͚the ĐitǇ,͛ aŶd to the 
complex local histories of specific urban territories, intersect with biological research on urban life in 
general? How, will such an attention help these new insights interact with research underway in the 
cities of the global south (Andrade et al., 2011)?    
 Some years ago, the anthropologist Margaret Lock (2001) pƌoposed the idea of ͚loĐal 
ďiologies͛ to shoǁ hoǁ ďiologiĐal diffeƌeŶĐe ŵight pƌoduĐe a ǀeƌǇ a diffeƌeŶt kiŶd of suďjeĐtiǀe 
experience – which would, in turn, produce shifts in the way that local worlds are both made and 
ŵade seŶse of. LoĐk͛s ĐoiŶage is a valuable contribution to thinking the intersection of body and 
spaĐe. But ǁe ǁoŶdeƌ if ǁe ŵight Ŷot dƌaǁ a ŵoƌe spatial oƌieŶtatioŶ ǁithiŶ LoĐk͛s suggestioŶ, ďǇ 
reversing the polarity of these terms, and thus beginning to scale the city in terms of its 'biological 
localities.' Could a simultaneously sociological and psychiatric research project gain anything by re-
imagining the city as a complex and layered landscape of epigenetic districts, embodied 
neighbourhoods, and neurobiological streets? Could we use the image of a biological locality to re-
think the sociological dynamics of specific and located urban spaces – especially as those dynamics 
work to map and re-map exchanges of power and capital, of surveillance and security, of stress, 
experience, and feeling, and sickness? We suggest that an attention to mapping such specific, local 
relationships between bodies and territories might, once again, generate the space for a revitalized 
sociology to contribute to biomedical knowledge on urban mental health.  
 
Conclusion  
In this paper, we have explored some of the ways in which the relationship between mental life and 
the metropolis has been understood by a variety of disciplines, over the last century or so, from 
epidemiologists, to ecological sociologists, to epigeneticists, and neurobiologists.  We have overlain 
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this history with a story of how researchers, from different traditions, have understood, enacted, 
and resisted, interactions between the social sciences and the life sciences. Of course there are 
complications to this account. We are conscious of earlier attempts at crossing the social and life 
sciences, not least the work of Bénédict Morel, where, amid widespread concerns about urban 
degeneracy, character, constitution, life forms and experience were inextricably interwoven (Pick, 
1989). And yet the work that we have described here gives us hope that relationship between urban 
life and mental health might prove a key testing-ground for re-vitalizing sociological research (that is: 
a sociology for which the unfolding of biological life is a key site of interest), and for culturing 
molecular biology (that is: a biology in which the shifting texture of not just 'social' but of 
sociopolitical life, in all its richness, complexity, diversity, and contest, is taken as a central 
interpretive tool for molecular styles of thought). History, here, is not merely a preamble, but a 
means of understanding some of the ways in which, contexts for which, and stakes in which, this 
relationship might be developed. Following Landecker and Panofsky (2013: 347), a revitalized 
sociology is one that, in this instance, would not point gesturally to 'the environment', but would 
explore more seriously and empirically the ways in which we can connect expertise in the political 
economy of urban housing, employment and policing to what we know about the stratification of 
biological expressions of stress, and the political, economic, cultural developments that produce a 
measurable effect on those expressions. That work is now underway, but much refinement is 
needed. The history of sociology's encounter with mental life in the metropolis might be an 
unexpectedly rich resource for thinking about those refinements might look like. 
We are utterly committed to the view that there is no role for sociology as an add-on, or a 
͚seƌǀiĐe͛ disĐipliŶe heƌe. PƌeĐiselǇ the opposite: the histoƌǇ of these ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs teaĐhes us that it is 
precisely a sociological form of attention that can help to thicken and enliven the connections that 
clinicians, epidemiologists, and neurologists are tracking between mental health and the metropolis. 
Recalling the invitation from the editors of Nature, our goal is to think about what that older 
sociology – with all its problems, but bursting with vitality nonetheless – can contribute to 
contemporary efforts to understand the profoundly emergent and biosocial texture of so much 
mental distress. The dominant idioms through which sociologists have interpreted, and continue to 
interpret, these developments in the life sciences – biologisation, medicalization, problematization – 
will have little to contribute to that effort.  A new language is required; in this paper, we have tried 
to sketch some of its elementary terms.   
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